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DEFINING “ACCIDENTS” IN THE AIR:
WHY TORT LAW PRINCIPLES
ARE ESSENTIAL TO INTERPRET
THE MONTREAL CONVENTION’S
“ACCIDENT” REQUIREMENT
Alexa West*
Exceptions do not exist in a vacuum; in fact, exceptions to a principle are
usually formed and understood using those principles to which they are an
exception. Even so, U.S. courts interpreting the accident requirement of the
Montreal Convention—an exception to traditional tort law regarding
injuries sustained during international air travel—fail to use tort law in
evaluating whether certain situations meet the accident criteria.
Consequentially, many decisions render airlines responsible for a
passenger’s injuries where in the same circumstances any other premises
owner would not be implicated. This directly contradicts the intent of the
Montreal Convention’s creators, who wanted to limit carrier liability to
foster the airline industry’s viability. Instead of interpreting “accident” to
make carriers liable in a narrower set of circumstances and thereby protect
airlines, courts are interpreting “accident” in a way that broadens the
airlines’ responsibilities.
This Note examines the history of, and the reasons for, the Montreal
Convention, which in part forces airlines to indemnify passengers for
injuries resulting from “accidents”—a term undefined in the treaty. The
Montreal Convention and the subsequent case law interpreting it
demonstrate how, to qualify as an “accident,” the injury-producing
incident must be causally connected to the plane’s operation. Importantly,
the causal connection’s adequacy should be evaluated according to
American tort jurisprudence even though the accident requirement itself is
an exception to general tort law. This Note focuses on a particular type of
injury-producing event, a copassenger tort, because of its interesting causal
nature that exemplifies the contrast between decisions using tort law and
those rendered under the Convention.

* J.D. Candidate, 2017, Fordham University School of Law; B.S.F.S., 2013, Edmund A.
Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University. Thank you to my fellow Law
Review members for their guidance and keen eyes, and to my father, mother, sister, and
grandfather Jerome Leitner, for their love, enthusiasm, and unwavering support.
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INTRODUCTION
Brandi Wallace expected her flight from Seoul, South Korea, to Los
Angeles, California, to be routine. After consuming a meal, having a drink,
and reading her book, Wallace fell asleep in her window seat.1 According
to the standard procedure for long flights, the lights in the cabin were
dimmed to help passengers adjust to time changes and ensure their
comfort.2 Some time later, Wallace awoke to find that Kwang-Yong Park,
the passenger seated beside her, had undone her belt while she was asleep,
unzipped her pants, and put his hand inside her underwear to fondle her

1. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Korean Air Lines Co. v. Wallace, 531 U.S.
1144 (2001) (No. 00-560).
2. See Andrei Ciobanu, Saving the Airlines: A Narrower Interpretation of the Term
“Accident” in Article 17 of the Montreal Convention, 31 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 1, 17
(2006) (“Darkening the cabin on long flights is necessary for the passengers’ comfort.”).
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private parts.3 Wallace reported the incident to a Korean Airlines
crewmember, and the crewmember assigned Wallace a new seat
immediately.4 Park was arrested upon arrival in Los Angeles.5
This sexual assault is an example of a copassenger tort,6 when one
passenger on a flight injures another passenger or causes another passenger
to be injured. The Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for
International Carriage by Air (“the Montreal Convention” or “the
Convention”) is an international treaty that governs the existence and
amount of an air carrier’s liability for passenger injuries sustained on
international flights, including those resulting from copassenger torts.7 The
Convention premises injuries for which the airline can be liable on whether
that injury was caused by an “accident” within the meaning of the treaty.8
Yet “accident” is not explicitly defined in the document, and this ambiguity
forces U.S. courts to apply a heavily fact-based inquiry as to whether
certain occurrences are “accidents” under the Convention. This creates a
body of U.S. law regarding international air carrier liability that leaves both
plaintiffs and airlines uncertain as to what claims will succeed in court.9
Prior to the incident described above, Park did not act suspiciously, the
crew did not notice any unusual behavior, and Wallace did not alert or
complain to the attendants about Park.10 Korean Air could not have
prevented the sexual assault, because it could not possibly have foreseen its
occurrence. Even so, and even though Wallace herself conceded that the
assault was not caused “by a lack of due care on the part of” Korean Air,11
the Second Circuit found the airline liable for Wallace’s assault.12 Using
3. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 3.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. Recently, there has been growing concern about sexual assaults on airplanes. See
Karen Schwartz, Recent Incidents Put a New Focus on Sexual Assault on Airplanes, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 20, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/20/travel/recent-incidents-put-anew-focus-on-sexual-assault-on-airplanes.html?smprod=nytcore-iphone&smid=nytcoreiphone-share&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/347J-WV3R].
7. See Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by
Air, May 28, 1999, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 106-45 (2000) [hereinafter Montreal Convention].
8. See id. art. 17; see also Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 398–99 (1985) (“[The treaty]
specified that air carriers would be liable if an accident caused the passenger’s injury.”
(emphasis omitted)); Ehrlich v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 360 F.3d 366, 382 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[The
Convention] held carriers liable in the event of an accident.”).
9. As one scholar put it, contemplating the meaning of an article 17 accident has
become “a metaphysical exercise roughly equivalent to contemplating the number of angels
that may dance on the head of a pin.” Louise Cobbs, The Shifting Meaning of ‘Accident’
Under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention: What Did the Airline Know and What Did It
Do About It?, 24 AIR & SPACE L. 121, 121 (1999).
10. See Wallace v. Korean Air, No. 98 Civ. 1039 (RPP), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4312, at
*3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 1999).
11. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 4.
12. See Wallace v. Korean Air, 214 F.3d 293, 300 (2d Cir. 2000). This precedent,
holding airlines liable for injuries caused by incidents wholly out of their control, essentially
imposes strict liability on the airlines for any injuries resulting on international flights, which
is neither the intention of the Warsaw Convention’s creators nor consistent with other
American law. See SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE AERONAUTICAL LAW:
OCTOBER 4–12, 1929, WARSAW 49 (Robert C. Horner & Didier Legrez trans., 1975)
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particularized and inconsistent precedent, the Second Circuit found that
Wallace’s sexual assault was an “accident” as defined by the Montreal
Convention.13 In analogous cases, however, courts have not found
premises owners liable where the same conduct occurred in a bus, bar, boat,
or other on-ground premises.14
This challenges one’s traditional sense of justice, as it contradicts
American jurisprudence’s embodiment of the ethical assumption that one
should be liable only for injuries one has caused or has a duty to prevent.15
In conjunction with this tenet is that one has a duty only to prevent harms
one can reasonably foresee.16 The Second Circuit’s decision circumvented
these foundational principles of American tort law by neglecting to use
them in its inquiry of the sufficiency of the causal connection of the assault
to the operation of the aircraft.
This Note argues that, although the accident threshold in the Montreal
Convention for air carrier liability was included to be an exception to tort
law principles,17 tort principles still are necessary to interpret the accident
requirement. Accidents must be causally connected to the operation of the
aircraft,18 and the sufficiency of this causal connection must be interpreted
in light of American tort principles to fulfill the intent of the Montreal
Convention’s drafters and to align Montreal Convention decisions with
American jurisprudence’s inherent sense of justice regarding who should be
liable for negligence and injuries.
[hereinafter WARSAW MINUTES] (noting British representative to the Warsaw Convention Sir
Alfred Dennis’s statement that “it is therefore not just to impose absolute liability upon the
carrier”).
13. See Wallace, 214 F.3d at 300.
14. See, e.g., Jaffess v. Home Lines, Inc., No. 85 Civ. 7365 (MJL), 1988 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3481 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 1988) (finding cruise ship owners not liable for a
passenger’s sexual assault while on the ship). In Jaffess, the court was following Supreme
Court precedent laid out in Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S.
625, 632 (1959), in which the Court held “the owner of a ship in navigable waters
owes . . . the duty of exercising reasonable care under the circumstances.” The Second
Circuit had reaffirmed this precedent specifically regarding passengers on ships. See
Monteleone v. Bahama Cruise Line, Inc., 838 F.2d 63, 65 (2d Cir. 1988); Rainey v. Pacquet
Cruises, Inc., 709 F.2d 169, 172 (2d Cir. 1983). Under the particular circumstances in
Jaffess—a sexual assault on a cruise ship’s passenger—the court found that “[i]f anything,
sexual assault seems less likely to occur on ships than on land” because assailants on land
have the opportunity to “flee the vicinity, while persons on ships cannot.” Jaffess, 1988 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 3481, at *11. Therefore, the court found the premises owner had exercised
“reasonable care” and refused to hold it liable for the sexual assault. See id. at *10.
15. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 901 (AM. LAW INST. 1939) (noting that
the purpose of tort law is to “punish wrongdoers”); see also William M. Landes & Richard
A. Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851, 861–62 (1981)
(“[I]f asked what tort law is based upon, most tort lawyers would answer that it is based
upon notions of justice, equity, fairness, or morality.”).
16. See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928) (noting that if
people were liable “without suspicion of the danger,” then “[l]ife will have to be made over,
and human nature transformed, before prevision so extravagant can be accepted as . . . the
customary standard to which behavior must conform”).
17. See Ciobanu, supra note 2, at 13 (“[T]he Warsaw Convention was meant to
distinguish between traditional tort injuries and aircraft-related injuries.”).
18. See infra Part III.A.
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Part I of this Note examines the history of the Montreal Convention and
focuses on the reasons for its implementation. It explains how the Warsaw
Convention was passed in 1929 to protect the young airline industry from
liability levels that could threaten its viability.19 Ultimately, these goals
went unmet as numerous amendments stripped the Convention of its
uniformity and easy applicability. To fix this confusion, the signatories to
the Warsaw Convention met in 1999 and created the Montreal Convention,
which superseded the original convention and sought to fix these issues.
Part II then explains current American jurisprudence under the Montreal
Convention and courts’ reasoning in labeling certain happenings as
“accidents.” Part II also considers the current state of copassenger torts
under American precedent.20
Part III reexamines the Convention’s legislative history and the operative
U.S. cases interpreting the word “accident” to prove that a causal
connection to the aircraft is necessary for an incident to be an “accident.”
Part III also advocates for the use of American tort principles to analyze the
validity of an alleged accident’s causal connection to the aircraft’s
operation. Using tort principles to decide whether the causal connection is
sufficient to render airlines liable facilitates the intent of the creators of the
Convention, the purpose of U.S. tort law, and the foundational sense of
morality that underpins the American legal system. Finally, Part III
attempts to draw the line at what kinds of copassenger torts are accidents by
focusing on what connections these torts must have to the aircraft’s
operation and the sufficiency of these connections under traditional tort law.
I. A HISTORY OF AIR CARRIER LIABILITY
FOR INJURIES ON INTERNATIONAL FLIGHTS
Commercial air travel is how our increasingly globalized society shares
persons and resources. In less than one hundred years, air travel has gone
from nonexistence to transporting 3.5 billion people in 2015.21 That is
almost half of the world’s population.22 Commercial air travel is integral to
the world’s economy: consumers spend 1 percent of world GDP on air
transport, and airlines and their customers generate around $116 billion in

19. See infra Part I.A.
20. Thus far, American courts have been reluctant to contribute to the “Talmudic
debate” of whether all copassenger torts are accidents under the Warsaw Convention. See
Wallace v. Korean Air, 214 F.3d 293, 299 (2d Cir. 2000) (“Happily, this Talmudic debate is
academic in the unique circumstances of this case. Indeed, we have no occasion to decide
whether all co-passenger torts are necessarily accidents for purposes of the Convention.”).
In addition, examining what is and is not an “accident” under the Warsaw Convention
through the lens of copassenger torts will help clarify the scope of the Warsaw Convention’s
liability and better align current Montreal Convention jurisprudence with previous precedent
and the intent of the treaty’s drafters. Id.; see also infra Part II.C.
21. IATA, ANNUAL REVIEW 2016, at 55 (2016), http://www.iata.org/publications/
Documents/iata-annual-review-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/8FEF-R7WF].
22. See Current World Population, WORLDOMETERS, http://www.worldometers.info/
world-population/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2016) [https://perma.cc/BPF4-DS7C].
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tax revenue for governments around the globe.23 Despite this, the
commercial airline industry is economically fragile24 and needs insulation
from crippling financial loss through certain limitations on liability.25 One
such protective device is the Montreal Convention, an international treaty
governing the liability of air carriers for injuries that occur onboard
aircrafts.26
The Montreal Convention’s predecessor, the Warsaw Convention,27
prioritized protecting the then-nascent airline industry.28 Understanding the
creators’ objectives and concerns are essential to properly interpret
Montreal Convention “accidents.”29 Accordingly, Part I traces the history
of the Montreal Convention, its structure, and its main goals of unifying
liability standards and limiting liability for air carriers. Part I.A reviews the
intentions of the Warsaw Convention’s creators and the purposes for its
creation. Part I.B examines the Montreal Convention, the purposes for
rewriting international air carrier liability standards, and what—if
anything—changed between the two Conventions.

23. See IATA, ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY 2 (2015),
https://www.iata.org/whatwedo/Documents/economics/IATA-Economic-Performance-ofthe-Industry-mid-year-2015-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/VBR6-K63Z].
24. See, e.g., Karen Walker, The IATA Forecasts Record 2015, 2016 Airline Profits, but
Cautions on Regional Disparity, AIR TRANSPORT WORLD (Dec. 10, 2015), http://
atwonline.com/airlines/iata-forecasts-record-2015-2016-airline-profits-cautions-regionaldisparity (noting “backwards steps” in airline profitability, “drop[s] in year-over-year
profitability,” and the head of the International Air Transport Association’s observation that
“large parts of the [airline] industry are still struggling”) [https://perma.cc/7MWJ-SYK8].
As recently as 2015, the “fragility of the [commercial airline] industry’s profitability might
come as a surprise.” Tony Tyler, Dir. Gen., IATA, Remarks at 71st Annual General Meeting
of International Air Transportation Association Curtain Raiser Press Conference (June 4,
2015), http://iata.org/pressroom/speeches/Pages/2015-06-04-01.aspx [https://perma.cc/RZ
D8-7U67]; see also Nisha Ramchandani, Global Carriers Cruise Towards Record Year but
Profits Remain Fragile, BUS. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2015), http://www.businesstimes.com.sg/
transport/global-carriers-cruise-towards-record-year-but-profits-remain-fragile-iata
(observing Director General Tyler’s remarks that “[t]he industry’s results . . . are not
outstanding when compared to the profits that are generated in other parts of the global
economy”) [https://perma.cc/V9BY-HNKX].
25. The head of the International Air Transport Association (IATA) has made a plea to
government leaders asking them to be “keen to support aviation’s financial health” with
strategies including liability-limiting regulations. Tony Tyler, Dir. Gen., IATA, Report on
the Air Transport Industry (June 8, 2015), http://www.iata.org/pressroom/speeches/Pages/
2015-06-08-01.aspx [https://perma.cc/7YHJ-HS9T].
26. See generally Montreal Convention, supra note 7.
27. See Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000 (1929) [hereinafter Warsaw Convention].
28. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Allan I. Mendelsohn, The United States and the
Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L. REV. 497, 499 (1967) (“The second goal—clearly
recognized to be the more important one—was to limit the potential liability of the carrier in
case of accidents.”).
29. These concerns still exist today, almost one hundred years after the Warsaw
Convention originally attempted to address them.
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A. The Warsaw Convention: Objectives and Liabilities
Thirty nations met in Warsaw, Poland, on October 4, 1929, to create
uniform international air carrier liability standards.30 As one scholar put it,
for the first time, an industry was going to “link many lands with different
languages, customs, and legal systems,” so lawmakers desired “at the
outset, a certain degree of uniformity.”31 A uniform system would make it
easier for all parties involved in civil airline litigation—claimants, carriers,
and governments—to know their rights and responsibilities and the origins
of those rights and obligations.32
A second paramount objective of the conference was to foster industry
growth by limiting international air carrier liability for personal injury,
death, and property damage.33 In the late 1920s, commercial air travel was
still an emerging industry.34 Limited liability would ensure the young
industry’s development, create predictable guidelines for airlines to secure
insurance, and stabilize the industry’s operating costs.35 Air carriers—
30. See PAUL B. LARSEN ET AL., AVIATION LAW: CASES, LAWS AND RELATED SOURCES
267–73 (2006).
31. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 28, at 498. The resulting treaty’s preamble
echoes this sentiment, stating the signatories “recognized the advantage of regulating in a
uniform manner the conditions of . . . the liability of the carrier.” Warsaw Convention, supra
note 27, at 3014; see also Zicherman v. Korean Airlines, 516 U.S. 217, 230 (1996)
(“Undoubtedly it was a primary function of the Warsaw Convention to foster uniformity in
the law of international air travel.”); Potter v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 98 F.3d 881, 885 (5th Cir.
1996) (“A primary function of the Warsaw Convention is to foster uniformity in the laws
governing international air carrier liability.”); see also Pittman v. Grayson, 869 F. Supp.
1065, 1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (“The Warsaw Convention was designed to effectuate two
central public policy goals: (1) to establish uniformity . . . as to documentation, and (2) to
limit air carriers’ potential liability in the event of accidents.”).
32. See Potter, 98 F.3d at 885 (“Uniformity with respect to liability is required in order
to allow airlines to raise the capital needed to expand operations and to provide a definite
basis upon which their insurance rates can be calculated.”); M. Veronica Pastor, Absolute
Liability Under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention: Where Does It Stop?, 26 GEO. WASH.
J. INT’L L. & ECON. 575, 576 (1993) (noting absent an international treaty, conflict of law
rules would apply to disputes arising from injuries on flights, and this system “would be
complicated, often confusing, and . . . would result in wide discrepancies in recovery and
liabilities for parties involved in a single incident”).
33. See Saks v. Air Fr., 724 F.2d 1383, 1386 (1984) (“It is believed that the principle of
limitation of liability will not only be beneficial to passengers and shippers as affording a
more definite basis of recovery and as tending to lessen litigation, but that it will also prove
to be an aid in the development of international air transportation” (quoting Message from
the President of the United States Transmitting a Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 73rd Cong. 3–4 (1934) (statement
of Secretary of State Cordell Hull))), rev’d, 470 U.S. 392; see also 7 GEORGE N. TOMPKINS,
JR., LIABILITY RULES APPLICABLE TO INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORTATION AS DEVELOPED
BY THE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM WARSAW 1929 TO MONTREAL 1999, at 3
(2006).
34. The total airline operations between 1925 and 1929, in both domestic and
international travel, were only 400 million passenger miles. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn,
supra note 28, at 498.
35. See Oliver v. Scandinavian Airlines Sys., No. M-82-3057, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17951, at *2–3 (D. Md. Apr. 5, 1983) (“[T]he Convention sought to limit the potential
liability of the air carrier so as to aid in the development of international air transportation, to
provide a definite basis for insurance rates for airlines, and thereby to reduce operating
expenses with subsequent savings to the airline industry and its passengers.”).
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which, before the conference, attempted to require passengers to
contractually accept a reduced or nonexistent level of carrier liability as a
condition of air travel36—were worried about compensating accident
victims who could threaten to bankrupt their business.37
The resulting treaty, the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to International Transportation by Air, known as “the Warsaw
Convention,” became law in 1933.38 It governed “the international carriage
of passengers, baggage, and cargo by air, and regulat[ed] the liability of
international air carriers in over 120 nations.”39 Article 17 of the Warsaw
Convention addressed international air carrier liability for personal injury or
death. It stated:
The carrier [is] liable for damage sustained in the event of the death or
wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a
passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so sustained took
place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of
embarking or disembarking.40

An airline’s liability was premised upon an accident causing the
claimant’s injury.41 Read alone, article 17 confers strict liability upon
airlines when an accident happens. However, as one scholar notes, “Article
17 is written in a way that clearly indicates that the clauses and parts of the
article are to be read as an inter-connecting part to a larger more intricate
whole.”42 Therefore, this strict liability must be read in line with the
Warsaw Convention’s other liability qualifying articles.
Article 17 created a presumption of liability on the air carriers unless they
could prove they had taken all “necessary measures to avoid the damage,”43

36. See WARSAW MINUTES, supra note 12, at 47. Purchasing a ticket secured this
arrangement.
37. See MacDonald v. Air Canada, 439 F.2d 1402, 1405 (1st Cir. 1971) (“The most
important purpose of the Warsaw Conference was the protection of air carriers from the
crushing consequences of a catastrophic accident, a protection thought necessary for the
economic health of the then emerging industry.”); see also Ciobanu, supra note 2, at 3;
Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 28, at 499 (“It was expected that [the Convention’s
limitation of liability] . . . would enable airlines to attract capital that might otherwise be
scared away by the fear of a single catastrophic accident.”). This threat still exists today
because of the airline industry’s vulnerable state: as recently as July 2015, the rate of
expected rise in the airline industry’s profitability has fallen; in addition, profit expectations
have dipped dramatically. See IATA, AIRLINE BUSINESS CONFIDENCE INDEX: JULY 2015
SURVEY
(2015)
https://www.iata.org/whatwedo/Documents/economics/bcs-jul-15.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K3AC-9V37].
38. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 27.
39. Loryn B. Zerner, Tseng v. El Al Israel Airlines and Article 25 of the Warsaw
Convention: A Cloud Left Unchartered, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1245, 1249 (1999).
40. Warsaw Convention, supra note 27, art. 17 (emphasis added).
41. See id.; see also Howard Sokol, Final Boarding Call—The Warsaw Convention’s
Exclusivity and Preemption of State Law Claims in International Air Travel: El Al Israel
Airlines v. Tseng, 74 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 227, 237 (2000) (“Deciding whether an accident
has occurred conclusively determines whether Article 17 applies.”); supra note 8 and
accompanying text.
42. Sokol, supra note 41, at 236 n.75.
43. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 27, art. 20.
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whereby article 20 allowed them to avoid liability entirely.44 When an
article 17 accident was found to have occurred, article 22 created a
monetary recovery limit of $8,300.45 The carrier also could limit damages
with a contributory negligence defense, embodied in article 21.46 The only
time a claimant could recover more than the Warsaw Convention’s
monetary limit was upon a showing of “willful misconduct” on the part of
the carrier.47
Essentially, the Warsaw Convention drew a fault-based line on personal
injury liability: if the airline negligently caused the accident, the claimant
could recover only up to the monetary limit; if the airline willfully caused
the accident, the claimant had unlimited recovery. However, the Warsaw
Convention did not make the airline liable for accidents wholly outside the
carrier’s control;48 as stated at the Warsaw gathering, “[The objective is]
just not to impose absolute liability upon the carrier but to relieve him of all
liability when he has taken reasonable and normal measures to avoid
damage: This is the diligence which one can demand of the reasonable
man.”49
After the Warsaw Convention’s implementation, many signatories found
the $8,300 liability limit too low to justly compensate accident victims.50
Air safety improvements made it easier for carriers to obtain low-cost
insurance (lessening their need for legislative protections), lawsuits for
accidents on airlines were consistently asking for damages exceeding the
Warsaw limit, and a political and academic contention that international air
carriers were no longer entitled to special protection began gaining
attention.51 The 1955 Hague Protocol, attempting to address these issues,
doubled the monetary limit on recoverable damages for article 17
accidents.52 It was the first of numerous amendments to the Warsaw
Convention over the next forty years, ultimately rendering the Warsaw
Convention unwieldy.53
44. Id.
45. See id. art. 22.
46. See id. art. 21.
47. See id. art. 25.
48. See id. art. 20.
49. WARSAW MINUTES, supra note 12, at 49 (statement of Sir Alfred Dennis, British
representative to the Warsaw Convention).
50. See, e.g., 111 CONG. REC. 20,164 (1965) (statement of Sen. Robert Kennedy) (“No
one questions the fact that the protection now afforded international travelers is woefully
inadequate.”); see also Maugnie v. Compagnie Nationale Air Fr., 549 F.2d 1256, 1258 n.4
(9th Cir. 1977) (noting how the United States denounced the Warsaw Convention because of
the low damages limit).
51. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 28, at 504; see also, e.g., Aleksander
Tobolewski, Against Limitation of Liability, A Radical Proposal, 3 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L.
261, 264–67 (1978) (arguing for strict liability for torts occurring on an aircraft).
52. See TOMPKINS, supra note 33, at 5.
53. The Warsaw Convention was next amended by the 1961 Guadalajara Supplementary
Convention. Its purpose was to make the liability rules of the Warsaw Convention and
Hague Protocol applicable to both the actual carrier and the contracting carrier when the
actual carrier was not a “successive carrier” under the Warsaw Convention’s definition. See
id. at 8. The 1966 Montreal Agreement and the 1971 Guatemala Protocol were further
efforts to achieve uniform liability systems and created a higher carrier liability damages
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B. The Montreal Convention:
Broadening Carrier Liability Standards
and Shifting Their Bases
The Warsaw Convention and its supplemental amendments became
convoluted and far from uniform.54 In order to unify the previous forty
years’ piecemeal amendments, representatives from 118 countries and
eleven international organizations met in Montreal in May 1999.55 The
International Civil Aviation Organization’s then-president stated at the
opening of the Montreal conference:
[The Warsaw Convention’s] complexity has been further extended by
adding additional rules . . . . The result of these uncoordinated efforts is
an increasingly opaque legal framework whose usefulness . . . has become
a matter of growing concern, and it is the shared desire of the parties
involved that legal certainty and uniformity be restored, while
implementing, in a globally-coordinated fashion, the long overdue
modernization and consolidation of the [Warsaw] system.56

This testimony echoes the Montreal Convention’s creators’ prioritization of
uniform and easy to follow international air liability standards.
A second goal of the Montreal Convention’s creators was to reflect the
amending provisions in their expansion of air carrier liability.57 The
Montreal Convention’s article 17 addressed air carrier liabilities for
personal death or injuries on flights, just as it did in the Warsaw

threshold. See LARSEN ET AL., supra note 30, at 272–73. The Montreal Protocol of 1975
updated the existing liability limits for death or injury by translating the damage limit
provision from the gold standard to another currency measure, “Special Drawing Rights”
(SDRs). The International Monetary Fund had created the SDR in the wake of abandoning
the gold standard. See id. Finally, in 1998, IATA created a contractual arrangement of
airlines to withdraw from the 1966 Montreal agreement and to create a new language on
tickets; carrier signatories agreed not to invoke the monetary limit of damages arising under
article 17 and the nonfault defense of article 20(1) for claims under 100,000 SDRs. See id. at
274.
54. See Runwantissa Abeyratne, The Economy Class Syndrome and Air Carrier
Liability, 28 TRANSP. L.J. 251, 271 (2001) (noting that the Warsaw Convention “did not
succeed in presenting to the world unequivocally objective and quantified rules of liability,”
thus precluding “a plaintiff from knowing that he would be, as a rule, compensated if he is
injured in an air accident”).
55. See TOMPKINS, supra note 33, at 27.
56. 1 INT’L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON AIR LAW:
MONTREAL, 10–28, MAY 1999, at 37 (1999); see also Milestones in International Civil
Aviation, ICAO, http://www.icao.int/about-icao/History/Pages/Milestones-in-InternationalCivil-Aviation.aspx (noting that when the Montreal Convention came into effect on
November 4, 2003, ICAO Council President Assad Kotaite remarked, “Victims of
international air accidents and their families will be better protected and compensated under
the new Montreal Convention, which modernizes and consolidates a seventy-five year old
system of international instruments of private international law into one legal instrument”)
(last visited Nov. 19, 2016) [https://perma.cc/G579-NVKE].
57. See Weiss v. El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd., 433 F. Supp. 2d 361, 365 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(noting that the Montreal Convention “represents a significant shift away from a treaty that
primarily favored airlines to one that continues to protect airlines from crippling liability, but
shows increased concern for the rights of passengers” by broadening carrier liability).
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Convention.58 The Warsaw Convention’s presumption of air carrier
liability remained in Montreal’s article 17, but the damages cap was
significantly increased (from $8,300 to 100,000 “Special Drawing Rights”
(SDRs), an international reserve asset the International Monetary Fund
created, equivalent to approximately $135,000).59 It also stripped air
carriers of any defense in actions under 100,000 SDRs.60 The carrier could
escape claims over 100,000 SDRs only if it could prove that factors other
than its negligence, like a third party’s act, caused the damages.61 Whereas
the Warsaw Convention had divided its two tiers of recovery based on fault,
the Montreal Convention did so monetarily.62
Significantly, for the first time in aviation law, plaintiffs could recover
unlimited damages for negligence claims.63
The Department of
Transportation’s under secretary for policy found this elimination of “all
artificial monetary limits on recoveries from the airline for proven damages
with respect to the death or injury of a passenger during an international
airline mishap” a cornerstone of the new treaty, and he made sure to point it
out when urging the Senate to include the United States as a Montreal
Convention signatory.64
Yet, despite its newly aligned purposes and liability parameters, there
were no substantive changes in the liability-inducing provision of the
Montreal Convention (still article 17).65 Because of the lack of substantive
58. See Montreal Convention, supra note 7, art. 17 (“The carrier is liable for damage
sustained in case of death or bodily injury of a passenger upon condition only that the
accident which caused the death or injury took place on board the aircraft or in the course of
any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.”). Although there were slight changes
in language—the Montreal Convention’s “in case of death or bodily injury” replaced the
Warsaw Convention’s “in the event of the death or wounding of a passenger or any other
bodily injury”—no substantive liability changes were made. Compare Montreal Convention,
supra note 7, art. 17, with Warsaw Convention, supra note 27, art. 17; infra note 65 and
accompanying text.
59. See Larry Moore, The New Montreal Liability Convention, Major Changes in
International Air Law: An End to the Warsaw Convention, 9 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 223,
227 (2001).
60. See Montreal Convention, supra note 7, art. 21. By contrast, the Warsaw
Convention allowed a carrier to escape liability at any monetary damage level if it could
prove it had taken all necessary measures to prevent the damage or that those measures were
impossible. See LARSEN ET AL., supra note 30, at 275.
61. See Ciobanu, supra note 2, at 5.
62. See id. (“[U]nder the Montreal Convention, there is no longer any distinction
between limited and unlimited liability based on the plaintiff’s cause of action. Instead, the
distinction arises from the amount of damages that the plaintiff can prove.”).
63. See Allan I. Mendelsohn & Renée Lieux, The Warsaw Convention Article 28, the
Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, and the Foreign Plaintiff, 68 J. AIR L. & COM. 75, 110
(2003). In other words, there is a limit to the finding of liability, but in some circumstances,
there is no limit to the amount of recovery once the airline is found liable.
64. S. EXEC. REP. NO. 108-8 (2003) (statement of Hon. Jeffrey N. Shane).
65. See Doe v. Etihad Airways, No. 13-14358, 2015 WL 5936326, at *1 (E.D. Mich.
Oct. 13, 2015) (“The Montreal Convention superseded the Warsaw Convention, but retained
many of the Warsaw Convention’s substantive provisions.”); see also Andrew Field, Air
Travel, Accidents and Injuries: Why the New Montreal Convention Is Already Outdated, 28
DALHOUSIE L.J. 69, 78–79 (2005) (“The Montreal Convention was not altered in any
significant way with regard to the criteria by which a claim can be made for death or
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changes between the two treaties, most U.S. courts continued to interpret
article 17 in the same way they had under the Warsaw Convention; as the
Ninth Circuit observed, “in interpreting the Montreal Convention, courts
have routinely relied upon Warsaw Convention precedent where the
equivalent provision in the Montreal Convention is substantively the
same.”66
In the Montreal Convention, international air carrier liability continued to
be premised upon an accident occurring, and “accident” continued to be
undefined in the treaty.67 Due to this remaining definitional uncertainty,
U.S. courts defining the term “accident” have had to interpret the
Convention’s plain language and legislative history, creating inconsistent
and heavily fact-based precedent.
II. HOW THE UNITED STATES INTERPRETS “ACCIDENT”:
AIR FRANCE V. SAKS
The U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged that, alone, article 17’s language
was “stark and undefined” and thus granted certiorari in 1985 in Air France
v. Saks68 to resolve the conflict “as to the proper definition of the word
‘accident’ as used in [the Warsaw] treaty.”69 The Court examined the
Warsaw Convention’s article 17 because the Montreal Convention had not
yet been written or ratified.70 After examining the treaty’s plain language
(in its original French), legislative history, and subsequent interpretations in
both U.S. and foreign courts, the Court defined “accident” as an
“unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external to the
passenger.”71
Part II.A looks at the Supreme Court’s rationale in defining “accident,”
and Part II.B explains the confusion surrounding the definition. Saks has
proven to be inadequate in instructing U.S. courts as to whether certain
injury. . . . [I]t would appear that the 1929 conception of claims will remain for some time to
come.”).
66. Narayanan v. British Airways, 747 F.3d 1125, 1127 n.2 (9th Cir. 2014); see also
Doe, 2015 WL 5936326, at *1 (“Courts routinely look to legal precedent interpreting the
Warsaw Convention for substantively equivalent provisions of the Montreal Convention.”);
PAUL S. DEMPSEY & MICHAEL MILDE, INTERNATIONAL AIR CARRIER LIABILITY: THE
MONTREAL CONVENTION OF 1999, at 7 (2005) (noting that the Montreal Convention’s
drafters “tried, wherever possible, to embrace the language of the original Warsaw
Convention and its various Protocols, with the purpose of not disrupting the existing
jurisprudence . . . . Thus, the ‘common law’ of the Warsaw jurisprudence is vitally
important to understanding the meaning of the Montreal Convention.”). But see Sven Brise,
Economic Implications of Changing Passenger Limits in the Warsaw Liability System, 22
ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 121, 129 (1992) (arguing that the Montreal Convention’s changes
are enough to mandate replacement of Warsaw Convention case law).
67. See Montreal Convention, supra note 7, art. 17.
68. 470 U.S. 392 (1985).
69. Id. at 394; accord Janice Cousins, Note, Warsaw Convention—Air Carrier Liability
for Passenger Injuries Sustained Within a Terminal, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 369, 388 (1976).
70. Since the two conventions’ “accident” articles are essentially the same, see supra
note 58, the court’s interpretation can be used for both liability limiting treaties, see supra
note 66 and accompanying text.
71. Saks, 470 U.S. at 405.
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situations—in particular, whether certain copassenger torts—are
“accidents” under the Montreal Convention. The resulting confusion and
the inconsistent rulings it creates undermine the U.S. legal system’s pride in
predictability,72 making it difficult for airlines to predict the outcome of
particular cases to adequately insure themselves. Further, it makes injured
consumers unsure as to whether they will be able to recover damages. In
addition, the Saks definition leaves air carriers virtually unprotected from
liability, a result in stark contrast with the entire Montreal Convention’s
intent.73 Finally, Part II.C looks at the current state of copassenger torts
under this uncertain interpretation regime.
A. Saks and the “Unusual or Unexpected” Measure
After a flight from Paris to Los Angeles, Valerie Saks brought suit
against Air France, alleging the plane’s depressurization during the flight
caused her hearing loss.74 Saks’s claim rested on asserting the plane’s
depressurization was a Warsaw Convention article 17 accident.75 Air
France moved for summary judgment on the basis that the pressurization
system’s normal operation was not an “accident” under the Warsaw
Convention.76 While Saks urged the Court to define an article 17 accident
as a “hazard of air travel,” the airline contended an article 17 accident
should be defined as “an unusual or unexpected occurrence.”77
The Supreme Court began by examining the article’s plain language.78
The Court acknowledged, “the word ‘accident’ is not a technical legal term
with a clearly defined meaning” and therefore turned to its context within
the Warsaw Convention.79 The Court noted that, whether written in French
or English, the Warsaw Convention imposed article 17 liability for personal
injuries on “accidents” whereas article 18 (defining the scope of air carrier
liability for damage to cargo) imposed liability for damage to any checked
72. See, e.g., Maimon Schwarzschild, Keeping It Private, 25 U. QUEENSL. L.J. 215, 221
(2006) (“[P]redictability ranks fairly high among [U.S.] legal virtues: it is part of what
people mean by the Rule of Law.”); Stefanie A. Lindquist & Frank C. Cross, Stability,
Predictability and the Rule of Law: Stare Decisis as Reciprocity Norm 1 (Mar. 26, 2010)
(unpublished manuscript), https://law.utexas.edu/conferences/measuring/The%20Papers/
Rule%20of%20Law%20Conference.crosslindquist.pdf (noting that predictability “has a
moral valence insofar as it assures that like cases will be treated equally” and that absent
predictability, “citizens have difficulty managing their affairs effectively”)
[https://perma.cc/3LRJ-Z7JC].
73. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
74. Saks, 470 U.S. at 394.
75. Id. at 394–95.
76. Id. at 395.
77. Id.
78. See id. at 396–97. See generally Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31,
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the
light of its object and purpose.”); Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31, 33 (2d Cir.
1975) (“It seems elementary to us that the language employed in Article 17 must be the
logical starting point.”).
79. See Saks, 470 U.S. at 398 (quoting Fenton v. J. Thorley & Co. [1903] AC 443 (HL)
453 (appeal taken from Eng.)).
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baggage or goods for “occurrences.”80 This differentiation in language
indicated that the drafters understood accidents to be different than
occurrences.81 The drafters must have considered some factor present in
accidents and not present in occurrences significant enough to induce
liability for injury to persons rather than to baggage.82 The Court identified
this differentiating factor as the unusual or unexpected nature of accidents,
as opposed to the typicality of occurrences.83
In support of this finding, the Court looked to the Warsaw Convention’s
legislative history, noting that “[t]he records of the negotiation of the
Convention accordingly support what is evident from its text: A
passenger’s injury must be caused by an accident, and an accident must
mean something different than an ‘occurrence’ on the plane.”84 The Court
enumerated U.S. cases that, although employing a broad definition of
“accident,” still refused to consider routine travel procedures that produced
injuries as “accidents.”85 Finally, the Court considered sister signatories’
and U.S. courts’ interpretations of article 17 since the Warsaw
Convention’s ratification.86 For example, the Court discussed a French
legal opinion that held article 17 accidents embrace “causes of injuries that
are fortuitous or unpredictable.”87
Ultimately, the Court agreed with Air France that an accident is “an
unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external to the passenger”
and noted, “This definition should be flexibly applied after assessment of
all the circumstances surrounding a passenger’s injuries.”88 The Court
emphasized that it is the Court’s duty to “enforce the . . . treaties of the
United States, whatever they might be, and . . . the Warsaw Convention
remains the supreme law of the land.”89 Although the Supreme Court
defined “accident,” the definition requires more clarification, as inconsistent
“accident” interpretations continue in lower courts.

80. See id. at 397–98.
81. See id.; accord M. MILDE, THE PROBLEMS OF LIABILITIES IN INTERNATIONAL
CARRIAGE BY AIR 62 (1963).
82. See Saks, 470 U.S. at 397–98.
83. See id. at 399–400 (“The text of the Convention consequently suggests that the
passenger’s injury must be caused by an unexpected or unusual event.”).
84. Id. at 403. For a more detailed analysis of the Warsaw Convention’s legislative
history, see infra Part III.A.2.
85. See Saks, 470 U.S. at 405.
86. See id. at 404 (“[T]he opinions of our sister signatories [are] entitled to considerable
weight.” (quoting Benjamins v. British European Airways, 57 F.2d 913, 919 (2d Cir.
1978))); Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1975) (“The conduct of
the parties subsequent to ratification of a treaty may, thus, be relevant in ascertaining the
proper construction to accord the treaty’s various provisions.”).
87. See Saks, 470 U.S. at 404 (observing additionally that Swiss and German law
construe “accidents” as a sudden event independent of the will of the carrier).
88. Id. at 405. The Court also noted that this could expand air carrier liability to terrorist
or hijacking activity as well as some copassenger torts. Id.
89. Id. at 406 (alterations in original) (quoting Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1093 (2d
Cir. 1977)).
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B. Post-Saks Areas of Controversy
Regarding Article 17 Accidents
Saks’s unusual or unexpected measure does not work as a complete
indication of whether incidents are article 17 accidents. Alone, the Saks
inquiry is perspective based, focusing on the parties’ state of mind, which is
not a clear, consistent, or even fair way to assess the air carrier’s fault.90
For example, in Gotz v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,91 a passenger was injured
when placing a heavy bag in an overhead bin because another passenger
stood up, causing the plaintiff to move and hyperextend his arm.92 In this
case, the man standing up was unexpected from the perspective of the
passenger, but from the airline’s perspective, it was a normal and routine
occurrence in airline operation.93 In addition, there was no possible way in
which the airline could have prevented a man from standing up when he
was allowed to move around the cabin.94 Implicating the carrier in this
circumstance extends the carrier’s liability far past what the Warsaw
Convention’s drafters intended.95
Because of the uncertainty in Saks’s perspective-based inquiry, forums
have since considered a number of criteria in addition to the unusualness or
unexpectedness of an incident to determine what is and what is not an
accident. Some of these factors include (1) whether the incident was related
to the normal aircraft or airline operations; (2) if the crew members were
knowledgeable or complicit in the events surrounding the alleged accident;
(3) fellow passengers’ acts; (4) the acts of third parties who are not crew or
passengers (e.g., terrorists or hijackers); (5) the incident’s location; (6) the
complainant’s role, reaction, or condition in connection with the occurrence
at issue; and (7) the risks inherent in air travel.96 The two most frequently
considered factors are whether the incident must be a “risk inherent in air
90. See Ciobanu, supra note 2, at 12 (“The answer to such a question is whatever courts
desire it to be. Further, judges are more likely to view these cases through the eyes of a
consumer.”); see also Cobbs, supra note 9, at 123 (finding that after Saks, “the trend appears
to be towards an even fuzzier definition more or less dependent on perspective”).
91. 12 F. Supp. 2d 199 (D. Mass. 1998).
92. See id. at 200.
93. See id.; accord Kruger v. United Airlines, Inc., 481 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1010 (N.D.
Cal. 2007) (ruling that a passenger swinging a bag and unintentionally hitting another
passenger was an article 17 accident); Ciobanu, supra note 2, at 12.
94. See Gotz, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 200–01.
95. See WARSAW MINUTES, supra note 12, at 47.
What can one demand of the air carrier? A normal organization of his
operation, a judicious choice of his personnel, a constant surveillance of his agents
and servants, a rigorous control of his aircraft, spare parts and raw material.
One must indeed admit that those who use aircraft are not ignorant of the risks
inherent in a mode of transportation which has not yet attained the point of
perfection that one hundred years has given to railroads.
Id. at 49; supra note 49 and accompanying text.
96. See Fulop v. Malev Hungarian Airlines, 175 F. Supp. 2d 651, 657 (S.D.N.Y. 2001);
see also Domenica DiGiacomo, The End of an Evolution: From Air France v. Saks to
Olympic Airways v. Husain—the Term “Accident” Under Article 17 of the Warsaw
Convention Has Come Full Circle, 16 PACE INT’L L. REV. 409, 415 n.56 (2004); Judith R.
Karp, Mile High Assaults: Air Carrier Liability Under the Warsaw Convention, 66 J. AIR L.
& COM. 1551, 1560 (2001).
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travel”97 and if the incident was causally related to the operation of the
aircraft.98
Because Saks only addressed the “narrow issue [of] whether the
respondent can meet [the article 17] burden by showing that her injury was
caused by the normal operation of the aircraft’s pressurization system,”99
judges are uncertain about which factors are relevant in the “accident”
definition.100 For example, the Eastern District of New York held that a
woman falling off of her shuttle bus to pick up her luggage in a separate
area of the airport was an “accident” within the meaning of the Warsaw
Convention.101 The court rejected the notion that an article 17 accident
must be a “risk inherent in air travel” (which falling off of a bus certainly is
not; in fact, it is more a risk inherent in ground travel) because that kind of
inquiry would “necessarily involve courts in the ‘complicated, always fact
laden, and irrelevant question of what constitutes a risk characteristic of air
travel.’”102 However, the Southern District of New York held that a man
being accused of smoking marijuana in an airplane restroom was not an
“accident” solely because the situation was not an inherent air travel risk,
noting, “[o]n the theory that hijackings and terrorist attacks are risks
97. Some courts have treated the accident’s relation to the risks inherent in air travel as
paramount. See Abramson v. Japan Airlines Co., 739 F.2d 130, 133 (3d Cir. 1984) (finding
no accident when a passenger’s hernia was aggravated due to the airline staff’s refusal to
allow him to lay across seats because the denial was not a risk inherent in air travel); Pittman
v. Grayson, 869 F. Supp. 1065, 1070–71 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (observing, after examining the
legal precedent under article 17, that courts have focused on whether the alleged conduct
constitutes a risk inherent in air travel, a criterion explaining why instances such as aircraft
collisions and terrorist activities qualify as “accidents”); Curley v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 846 F.
Supp. 280, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (asserting that an international flight’s passenger being
falsely accused of smoking marijuana in the restroom was not a characteristic air travel risk
and was therefore not an article 17 accident). Some court decisions have asserted that
“accident” under article 17 need not be a risk inherent in air travel. See Girard v. Am.
Airlines, Inc., No. 00-CV-4559 (ERK), 2003 WL 21989978, at *5–6 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)
(holding that it is unnecessary for an injury to relate to risks characteristic of air travel);
Morris v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines [2001] EWCA (Civ) 790, [2002] QB 100 (Eng.)
(asserting that the Supreme Court’s “accident” definition under Saks does not justify
requiring an accident to have some relationship with an inherent air travel risk).
98. See Sethy v. Malev-Hungarian Airlines, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 8722, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12606, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2000) (holding that a trip and fall over another
passenger’s bag on the plane’s floor was not an accident under article 17 because the
incident did not relate to the operation of the aircraft or acts of the crew members); Gotz, 12
F. Supp. 2d at 204 (stating expressly that the unusual event Saks requires must be an
abnormal aircraft operation). But see Gezzi v. British Airways PLC, 991 F.2d 603, 605 n.4
(9th Cir. 1993) (stating that Saks did not indicate whether an accident must relate to aircraft
operations); Barratt v. Trin. & Tobago (BWIA Int’l) Airways Corp., No. CV 88-3945 (RR),
1990 WL 127590, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 1990) (finding that a passenger tripping and
injuring herself on a staircase while on her way to board the plane was an article 17 accident,
and stating that the definition of “accident” is “in no way limited to those injuries resulting
from dangers exclusive to aviation”).
99. Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 396 (1985); see also infra Part III.A.1.
100. See Cobbs, supra note 9, at 123 (“Because the Saks definition has left so much to the
factual situation, cases since Saks have not arrived at any bright line rule . . . .”).
101. See Girard, 2003 WL 21989978.
102. See id. at *5 (quoting Wallace v. Korean Air, 214 F.3d 293, 301 (2d Cir. 2000)
(Pooler, J., concurring)).
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characteristic of air travel, liability . . . has been expanded to include[]
injuries resulting from such attacks” and should not be expanded further.103
Whether the “risk inherent in air travel”104 and “causal connection to
aircraft operation” factors are considered essential creates two versions of
the “accident” definition: a narrow one, in which accidents must be (1)
unusual or unexpected, (2) external to the passenger, (3) causally connected
to an aircraft’s operation, and (4) a risk in inherent in air travel,105 and a
broader one, where an accident is (1) unexpected or unusual and (2)
external to the passenger, regardless of causal relation to the plane’s
operation or of the occurrence being an inherent air travel risk.106 The
broader definition, adopted by courts like the Ninth Circuit, essentially
imposes strict liability on international air carriers for injuries on planes or
while embarking or disembarking onto planes.107 Even courts using the
narrower scopes of article 17 accidents stretch the scope of liability to a
degree harmful to international air carriers and beyond the capacity to
which the drafters of these conventions wanted to subject airlines.108 This
is especially true regarding copassenger torts, where fact patterns are
intricate and the airline’s involvement in the injury or its prevention
requires more investigation than solely whether the tort was unusual or
unexpected.
C. The Current State of Copassenger Torts Under Article 17
Courts currently acknowledge that not all copassenger torts are article 17
accidents, although some scholars insist they should be.109 Generally,
courts have been disinclined to broaden article 17’s accident definition to
103. Curley v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 846 F. Supp. 280, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); accord
Maxwell v. Aer Lingus Ltd., 122 F. Supp. 2d 210, 213 (D. Mass. 2000) (“Liability for
injuries resulting from [the risk of terrorism] is allocated to the carrier for the simple reason
that the carrier is in a far superior position than are passengers to institute protective
safeguards.”).
104. Whether an article 17 accident must be a “risk inherent in air travel” is outside the
scope of this Note. The focus of this Note is on tort principles being used to interpret the
causal connection requirement. Yet, tort principles also should be used for the risk inherent
requirement in the sense that whether a risk is inherent in air travel is causally connected to
the air travel and that causal connection should be read in light of tort law. However, the
Saks Court seemingly rejected arguments that “accidents” “refer[] to any of the possible
hazards of air travel.” Pastor, supra note 32, at 583; see also Saks, 470 U.S. at 396
(disagreeing with the finding that “the Montreal [Convention] impose[s] absolute liability on
airlines for injuries proximately caused by the risks inherent in air travel”).
105. See, e.g., Curley, 846 F. Supp. at 283.
106. See, e.g., Gezzi v. British Airways PLC, 991 F.2d 603, 605 n.4 (9th Cir. 1993).
107. See infra notes 117, 122 and accompanying text; see also infra Part II.C.
108. See infra Part III.A. This is due to courts’ reluctance to use American tort principles
in their interpretation of the narrowing requirements. See infra Part III.B.
109. See, e.g., Langadinos v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 199 F.3d 68, 70 (1st Cir. 2000) (“Of
course, not every tort committed by a fellow passenger is a Warsaw Convention accident.”).
But see Blair J. Berkley, Warsaw Convention Claims Arising from Airline-Passenger
Violence, 6 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 499, 511 (2002) (“Characterizing passengeron-passenger assaults as Article 17 accidents, and imposing liability for injuries on airlines,
is good policy.”); Karp, supra note 96, at 1559 (arguing “Article 17 ‘accident’ encompasses
tortious actions of co-passengers”).
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include all copassenger torts.110 For example, the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania stated that the “premise that an accident under the Warsaw
Convention includes, as a matter of law, an assault committed upon a seated
Plaintiff by a fellow airline passenger is inaccurate.”111
However, courts using the broad “accident” definition, finding it
irrelevant whether an accident is a risk inherent in air travel or causally
related to the plane’s operation, implicitly allow for air carrier liability in all
copassenger torts.112 Under this broad definition, any injury that occurs on
an airplane implicates carriers solely because it occurred during air
travel.113 For instance, the Northern District of California held Singapore
Airlines liable for a passenger’s foot injury caused by another passenger
stepping on his foot.114 The carrier was held liable even though it could not
possibly have prevented the incident, because it occurred before takeoff
when passengers were allowed to walk around the plane.115
Some courts, while adhering to a narrower “accident” definition, do so in
a way that makes air carriers liable for basically all copassenger torts.116
Interpreting the narrowing requirement without considering American tort
law causation principles essentially swallows the narrowing factor itself.117
This liability extent is far beyond the Saks definition or what the Warsaw
and Montreal Conventions’ makers intended, considering they created the
conventions to limit airline liability.118 In addition, these far-reaching
decisions contradict a fundamental tort liability principle—that people
should be responsible only for injuries they should have and could have
prevented.119
Part III reexamines the logic in Saks, cases interpreting Saks, and the
conventions’ legislative histories. This reconsideration indicates that article
17 accidents must stem from incidents causally connected to aircraft
110. See Karp, supra note 96, at 1560.
111. O’Grady v. British Airways, 134 F. Supp. 2d 407, 412 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
112. See, e.g., Barratt v. Trin. & Tobago (BWIA Int’l) Airways Corp., No. CV 88-3945
(RR), 1990 WL 127590, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 1990) (holding that a plaintiff’s injury
sustained on an airport staircase constituted an article 17 accident even though the stairs
were not causally tied to the air craft’s operation).
113. See, e.g., Gezzi v. British Airways PLC, 991 F.2d 603, 605 (9th Cir. 1993).
114. See Kwon v. Sing. Airlines, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1047 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
115. The court called the narrowing factors “glosses . . . not contained in Article 17 or in
Saks.” Id. at 1045.
116. See Wallace v. Korean Air, 214 F.3d 293, 300 (2d Cir. 2000) (Pooler, J.,
concurring).
117. See Ciobanu, supra note 2, at 17 (“By [the court’s] rationale [in Wallace], the airline
is at fault for co-passenger torts simply because it transports passengers.”). In fact, one
scholar asserts that, because the Wallace Court could not find any event in the chain of
causation that fit the Saks definition, it “strained . . . taking the term ‘accident’ far beyond its
original purpose or intention.” Tory A. Weigand, Accident, Exclusivity, and Passenger
Disturbances Under the Warsaw Convention, 16 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 891, 966 (2001); see
also supra note 108 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 33–37 and accompanying text; see also Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S.
392, 407 (1985) (“[S]ome commentators have characterized the [Montreal] Agreement as
imposing ‘absolute’ liability on air carriers. . . . [This] characterization is not entirely
accurate.”); Pastor, supra note 32, at 582.
119. See supra note 16.
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operation and therefore do not encompass all copassenger torts. The
legislative history and relevant cases all point to using American tort
principles in interpreting article 17 accidents—a strategy many courts avoid
because of the conventions’ roles as exceptions to American tort
jurisprudence.120
III. ARTICLE 17 ACCIDENTS REINTERPRETED
An analysis of the Saks holding and a closer reading of the Montreal and
Warsaw Conventions indicate that in order to be an article 17 accident,
there must be a clear causal connection between the injury and the operation
of the aircraft. This conflates the two most frequently considered narrowing
factors (causal connection to aircraft operation and inherent air travel risks)
because, to be a risk inherent in air travel, such a risk must logically have a
causal connection to the travel.121 To hold these narrowing requirements as
unnecessary “would be effectively to construe the Convention as a statute
imposing absolute liability for any harmful occurrence on an international
flight,” and, as one district court noted, “there is neither a reason nor
authority for such a construction.”122 In addition, reexamining these
sources indicates that, although the conventions were created as a deviation
from tort liability, it is appropriate and in line with precedent to use these
tort principles in interpreting the conventions.123
Part III.A reexamines the Saks decision and the conventions’ legislative
histories to demonstrate that a causal connection to aircraft operation is
necessary for an incident to be an article 17 accident. Then, it discusses
why the causal limit on air carrier liability is good policy. Part III.B
analyzes the Saks decision, its progeny, and the conventions’ legislative
history to highlight the creators’ intent to analyze causation in light of tort
precedent. Finally, Part III.C delineates what kinds of copassenger torts
should be considered “accidents” under the Montreal Convention.
A. No Indemnification Without Causation:
The Necessity for an Accident
to Be Causally Connected to the Aircraft
The Saks decision unequivocally rejects the idea that the conventions
impose absolute liability on international air carriers for passengers’
injuries.124 Instead, the Court found that the accident must be unusual or

120. See infra Part III.B.1.
121. See supra note 104.
122. Gotz v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 199, 204 (D. Mass. 1998). In order to
come up with an equitable delineation of an article 17 accident, it is important to move away
from the passengers’ point of view and instead focus on delineating what injuries are risks
inherent in air travel or are actually caused by the operation of the aircraft. See supra notes
90–95 and accompanying text.
123. See infra Part III.B.
124. See supra note 118.
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unexpected to make the carrier liable.125 Part III.A.1 demonstrates that,
albeit not explicitly, the Saks decision requires a happening to be causally
connected to aircraft operation. Part III.A.2 explains that the conventions’
legislative histories echo that requirement. Finally, Part III.A.3 advocates
for this causal necessity in light of policy considerations and the current
state of the airline industry.
1. Saks’s Context and Treatment of Intention
Point to the Necessity for Causal Connections
Saks must be understood within its limited context to be correctly
interpreted.126 The Court’s restrictive rather than expansive definition of
“accident” is, as the First Circuit put it, “entirely understandable as Article
17 provides for strict liability [for accidents], and there are sound policy
reasons to confine that liability to the letter of the text, narrowly
construed.”127 Saks never addressed whether an article 17 accident must be
causally connected to the aircraft operation because it was never at issue;
causation was “assumed or implicit in the decision” because the fact pattern
was solely concerned with ear damage resulting from cabin
depressurization—an injury clearly resulting from the operation of an
aircraft.128 By deciding Saks based on the context before it, the Court did
not intend to “expand ‘accident’ beyond the intent of the drafters, eliminate
the need for there to be a connection between the injury producing event
and an aspect of aviation or air craft operation, or render all passenger upon
passenger torts actionable.”129
In addition, the Saks Court explicitly decided against adding
“unintended” or “unintentional” to the accident definition.130 This contrasts
with the article 17 accident definitions adopted by some sister signatories to
the conventions, like France, which require an incident be unintended to be
an “accident.”131 It also contrasts with the normal English language
125. See Saks v. Air Fr., 470 U.S. 392, 405 (1985) (“We conclude that liability under
Article 17 of the . . . Convention arises only if a passenger’s injury is caused by an
unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external to the passenger.”).
126. See id. at 396 (“The narrow issue presented is whether respondent can meet this
burden by showing that her injury was caused by the normal operation of the aircraft’s
pressurization system.”). But see Gezzi v. British Airways PLC, 991 F.2d 603, 605 n.4 (9th
Cir. 1993) (“It is not clear whether an event’s relationship to the operation of an aircraft is
relevant to whether the event is an ‘accident.’”).
127. McCarthy v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 56 F.3d 313, 316 (1st Cir. 1995) (asserting the
Supreme Court generally interprets article 17 “parsimoniously”); see also infra Part III.B.
128. Weigand, supra note 117, at 938–39 (“Lost by many decisions since Saks is the
undisputed fact that the abnormal operation of the aircraft was not at issue.”).
129. Id. at 938. Weigand also mentions that, “[w]hile the exact origins of this
[qualification] are not particularly clear[,] . . . it is derivative of the drafters’ intent to have
the Convention pertain to aviation accidents.” Id. at 949.
130. Compare Saks, 470 U.S. at 399–400 (“[T]he word ‘accident’ is often used
to . . . describe a cause of injury, and when the word is used in this . . . sense, it is usually
defined as a fortuitous, unexpected, unusual, or unintended event.”), with id. at 405 (“We
conclude that liability under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention arises only if a
passenger’s injury is caused by an unexpected or unusual event or happening.”).
131. See id. at 400 (defining the word “accident” in French).
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accident definition, which is defined referring to intent; for example,
Webster’s defines “accident” as a “happening that is not . . . intended.”132
The element of intention, if included, should focus on the carrier’s
perspective.133 Instead, the Saks Court chose to focus on a certain
occurrence’s expectedness based on a reasonable passenger’s perspective
and therefore did not assess the carrier’s fault. This is seemingly contrary
to the whole point of assigning liability—to make the person at fault pay for
damages.134
Leaving intention out of the accident inquiry does not fit within the
Warsaw Convention because the line between limited and unlimited
liability was explicitly drawn at willfulness.135 However, the Court
continued to refine this fault analysis by noting that an article 17 accident
does not occur if the injury results from a passenger’s internal reaction to
the “normal operation of the plane.”136 This exception to the Saks
definition’s language demonstrates that the Court viewed the fault element
as causally connected to the plane’s operation.137
The International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) interpretation provides
additional guidance. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that ICJ
interpretations deserve “respectful consideration” by U.S. courts.138 The
ICJ interpretation scheme, a model many courts around the world
emulate,139 gives more priority (than the Supreme Court’s interpretation) to
two principles: the principle of the natural meaning and the principle of
integration.140 The principle of the natural meaning provides that words
and phrases are interpreted in their normal context, and the principle of
integration advocates for interpreting treaties with continual reference to
their purposes.141 As the entire Montreal Convention concerns air travel, it
follows that all the articles and their words (such as “accident”) be
interpreted within the airplane’s context. Using this framework, a causal
connection to the aircraft is necessary. This causal connection can be
132. Accident, WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1999); see also
Accident, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2015) (defining “accident” as “[a]n
unfortunate incident that happens unexpectedly and unintentionally”).
133. The Warsaw Convention’s fault-based line drawing at willful misconduct versus
negligence is indicative of the airline’s perspective, if perspective is relevant at all. See
Ciobanu, supra note 2, at 12.
134. See id.
135. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 27, art. 25.
136. See Saks, 470 U.S. at 404.
137. See Ciobanu, supra note 2, at 13.
138. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 376 (2006).
139. See Melissa A. Waters, The U.S. Supreme Court and the International Court of
Justice: What Does “Respectful Consideration” Mean?, in THE SWORD AND THE SCALES:
THE UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 112, 113 (Cesare P.R.
Romano ed., 2009) (discussing Justice Breyer’s conception that “U.S. courts should
recognize the ICJ as an international tribunal with special expertise in matters of treaty
interpretation”).
140. See Gerald Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of
Justice 1951–4: Treaty Interpretation and Certain Other Treaty Points, 33 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L
L. 203 (1957).
141. See id. at 211, 223.
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anything from an equipment malfunction to the actions of the airline
employees; yet if an injury results from activity that has nothing whatsoever
to do with the plane’s operation, it should not be classified an “accident”
and expose carriers to liability.142 This causal necessity is echoed in the
Warsaw Convention’s and Montreal Convention’s legislative histories.
2. The Conventions’ Legislative Histories
Support a Mandated Causal Connection
Treaty interpretation endeavors to give meaning to the drafters’
intentions.143 As such, courts “may look beyond the written words to the
history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construction adopted
by the parties” to more precisely understand the treaty’s purposes.144
Because article 17 lacks substantive change from the Warsaw to the
Montreal Convention, it is appropriate to look at both conferences’
legislative histories to gauge the intended air carrier liability limits.145
These legislative histories indicate that the treaty creators presupposed an
incident’s causal connection with the aircraft in qualifying it as an article 17
accident and did not advocate for a strict liability standard. The Warsaw
Convention’s drafters were presented with two options for personal injury
liability language: a preliminary plan for their consideration created by a
team of experts, the Comité International Technique d’Experts Juridique
Aériens (CITEJA),146 and a draft developed at a previous conference, the
Paris Protocol.147 Ultimately, the drafters chose the CITEJA proposal’s
“narrower language” for liability, a choice from which the Supreme Court
found it “reasonable to infer that the Conference adopted the narrower
142. This is in line with American tort jurisprudence. See infra Part III.B.
143. See Maximov v. United States, 299 F.2d 565, 568 (2d. Cir. 1962), aff’d, 373 U.S. 49
(1963) (noting that courts strive to give “the specific words of a treaty a meaning consistent
with the genuine shared expectations of the contracting parties”).
144. See Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 396 (1985) (quoting Choctaw Nation of Indians v.
United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431–32 (1943)); accord Maugnie v. Compagnie Nationale Air
Fr., 549 F.2d 1256, 1258 (9th Cir. 1977) (“[I]t is well established that treaty interpretation
involves a consideration of legislative history and the intent of the contracting parties.”); Day
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31, 35–36 (2d Cir. 1975); Block v. Compagnie
Nationale Air Fr., 386 F.2d 323, 336–38 (5th Cir. 1967).
145. See 149 CONG. REC. S10,870 (daily ed. July 31, 2003) (statement of Sen. Biden)
(“[A] large body of judicial precedents has developed during the[] seven decades [since the
United States became a party to the Warsaw Convention]. The negotiators intended . . . to
the extent applicable, to preserve these precedents.”); see also LARSEN ET AL., supra note 30,
at 349 (“[E]fforts were made in the negotiations and drafting [of the Montreal Convention]
to retain existing language and substance of other provisions to preserve judicial precedent
relating to other aspects of the Warsaw Convention, in order to avoid unnecessary litigation
over issues already decided by courts under the Warsaw Convention.” (quoting S. EXEC. REP.
NO. 108-8 (2003) (statement of Hon. Jeffrey N. Shane))); see also supra note 67 and
accompanying text.
146. See Ehrlich v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 360 F.3d 366, 382 (2d Cir. 2004); see also
WARSAW MINUTES, supra note 12, at 257–68 (reprinting the preliminary draft); see also
Pastor, supra note 32, at 578 (explaining CITEJA’s spatial, rather than fault-induced,
liability impositions).
147. See Saks, 470 U.S. at 401 (“The treaty that became the Warsaw Convention was first
drafted at an international conference in Paris in 1925.”).
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language [of the CITEJA proposal] to limit the types of recoverable
injuries.”148
Finally, the writings of Dieter Goedhuis, the Warsaw Convention’s
official reporter, insisted the drafters’ clear intention was that air carriers be
freed from strict liability for passenger injuries, writing that “the carrier
does not guarantee safety; he is only obliged to take all the measures which
a good carrier would take for the safety of his passengers.”149 Goedhuis
necessitated causal connection to the aircraft even in the specific case of
copassenger torts: “In [a case] . . . in which a passenger is injured in a fight
with another passenger, it would be unjustifiable to declare the carrier liable
by virtue of Article 17, because the accident which caused the damage had
no relation with the operation of the aircraft.”150 A second look at the
Warsaw Convention’s legislative history and the Saks interpretation of that
history and language indicate that causal connections are necessary between
an incident and injury to qualify as an article 17 accident.
3. Necessitating an Accident’s Causal Connection
Is Good Policy
Airlines need protection, and mandating a causal connection with the
aircraft to classify injuries as article 17 accidents is an incredibly protective
measure. Commercial air carriage is a fragile industry151 in need of
governmental safeguards for multiple reasons:
small airlines need
protections to grow in a competitive market dominated by large
international airlines and large airlines need financial safeguards to continue
providing services because of the insecure status of the airline industry.
Unfortunately, today’s Montreal Convention scheme does not provide
this protection. As one author put it, “[T]he combination between the
Montreal Convention’s expansion of liability and the precedents developed
under Article 17 has the potential to harm the viability of commercial air
travel.”152 Requiring a causal connection limits air carrier liability to
certain situations153 instead of inundating them with responsibility for any
injury that occurs on a plane. Courts arguing otherwise “fail[] to take
account of the fact that the same risk occurs in every other walk of life” and

148. E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 543 (1991); accord Sokol, supra note 41, at
249 (noting that the Warsaw Convention’s article 24(2) limiting language, which reviews
damage limits, refers only to cases where an “accident” causes an injury, and therefore
“logically implies that there are cases not covered by Article 17”).
149. DIETER GOEDHUIS, NATIONAL AIRLEGISLATIONS AND THE WARSAW CONVENTION 200
(1937).
150. Id.; see also Price v. British Airways, No. 91 Civ. 4947 (JFK), 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9581, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 1992).
151. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
152. Ciobanu, supra note 2, at 25. This is especially true under the Montreal
Convention’s monetary two-tier scheme, where airlines are extremely vulnerable in the
lower tier. Id.
153. These situations end up being ones in which the airline is in the best position to
mitigate risks, in line with American tort jurisprudence. See infra Part III.C.
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unreasonably extend air carrier liability past notions of premises liability for
torts occurring on land.154
The Montreal Convention applies to small airlines as well as large
international ones.155 Many assume the Convention only applies to large
international air carriers, but in fact, the Convention applies to any carrier
on a passenger’s itinerary if the itinerary includes at least two stopping
points in different sovereigns’ territories.156 This means the Montreal
Convention can cover any airline, even a domestic one.157 For example, a
passenger goes from London to New York, then changes planes and goes
on a different airline’s flight from New York to Washington. The Montreal
Convention would apply if that passenger were injured on the second,
purely domestic flight, even if that airline had never sent a plane outside
U.S. borders.158 Notably, “the Montreal Convention has a broader reach
than a first glance would reveal.”159 Small domestic airlines need
protection to compete in the oligarchic commercial air travel industry.160
In addition, even bigger airlines—who some assume “are in a position to
distribute among all passengers what would otherwise be a crushing burden
upon those few unfortunate enough to become ‘accident’ victims”161—need
protection due to the commercial air industry’s fragile economic state and
“weak profitability.”162 Even though today’s international air travel
contributes significantly to the world economy, there is a “mismatch
between the value that the industry contributes to economies and the
rewards that it generates” for investors and the airlines themselves.163 Even
the International Air Transport Association’s president concedes that all
154. MONTREAL CONVENTION, ch. III, art. 17, para. 20 (Elmar Giemulla & Ronald
Schmid eds., 2011); supra note 14 and accompanying text.
155. The Montreal Convention applies to all “international carriage of persons, baggage
or cargo performed by aircraft.” Montreal Convention, supra note 7, art. 1.1.
156. See id. art. 1.2. Any carrier on the itinerary is covered regardless of whether there is
a break in the travel, different airlines are involved, or the sovereigns on the itinerary have
signed the Convention. See Ciobanu, supra note 2, at 5.
157. See Ciobanu, supra note 2, at 6 (“[A]n airline that is domestic in the sense of
deriving most of its profits from flights within the same country may easily enter into the
international carriage arena, by virtue of the contracts into which it enters.”).
158. See id.
159. Id.
160. See Evelyn D. Sahr & Drew M. Derco, Airlines Need Protection Too, 26 AIR &
SPACE L. 1, 4 (2013) (“Airlines (particularly smaller airlines) do not have the capability to
prevent all such errors [and] . . . [t]he financial cost of such an error could be devastating,
particularly for smaller airlines.”); see also Brise, supra note 66, at 128 (noting that
indemnification under the Montreal Convention has the potential to bankrupt sovereign
states if brought against small state-owned carriers).
161. Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31, 34 (2d. Cir. 1975). Recently, US
Airways and American Airlines merged and created the world’s largest airline to compete
with other airlines that had benefitted from “megamerger[s].” See American Airlines Bulks
Up, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/15/opinion/americanairlines-bulks-up.html [https://perma.cc/BG84-XK6R].
162. See The State of Airline Industry, 100 Years In, SKIFT (June 2, 2014, 9:00 AM),
http://skift.com/2014/06/02/the-state-of-airline-industry-100-years-in/ (“With a net profit
margin of just 2.4%, airlines will retain only $5.42 per passenger carried.”)
[https://perma.cc/FP8U-RHLC]; see also supra note 23 and accompanying text.
163. See The State of Airline Industry, 100 Years In, supra note 162.
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airlines need governments to enact “regulatory structure[s] that facilitate[]
[their] success” and curb liability.164
Also, the United States’s continued signatory status to the Montreal
Convention echoes the legislature’s insistence that airlines are persistently
in need of liability protection. It is not for the judicial but rather the
legislative and executive branches to evaluate whether air carriers should be
strictly liable for injuries that occur on planes or whether air carriers are in a
state to do so.165 The concerns of the Warsaw Convention’s creators are
still just as paramount today, one hundred years after the creation of air
travel, as they were at the dawn of the industry. For example, after the
September 11 terrorist attacks, Congress enacted the Air Transportation
Safety and System Stabilization Act, which capped liability claims against
airlines that arose from the attacks.166 Although a domestic action, the
legislation limiting liability was enacted to prevent the airline industry’s
collapse.167 As one scholar put it, “These [more recent] measures
demonstrate that the limits on recovery for claims against the airlines are
not relics of the past.”168
Because causal connections between incidents and injuries are necessary
in article 17 accident inquiries, courts must uniformly interpret these
connections’ sufficiency. They can do so while remaining consistent with
the intent of the conventions’ creators by using tort law notions of
negligence, proximate causation, and foreseeability.
B. General Tort Principles Are Necessary
to Analyze Causal Connections
The causal connections between injuries and aircraft operation should be
analyzed with general tort principles. Part III.B.1 illustrates how the
conventions, their legislative history, and their subsequent interpretation do
not exclude using tort law. In fact, the sources seem to advocate using it.
Part III.B.2 then applies tort principles to a particular Supreme Court case,
Olympic Airways v. Husain,169 and demonstrates how using tort law to
interpret causal connections removes some of the subjective fact-based
inquiry and ambiguity as to what is and what is not an article 17 accident
throughout U.S. courts, while maintaining the purpose of the Montreal
Convention.
164. See id. (“Governments should understand that the real value of aviation is the global
connectivity it provides and the growth and development it stimulates, not [wealth] . . . that
can be extracted from it.”).
165. See In re Aircrash in Bali on Apr. 22, 1974, 684 F.2d 1301, 1308–09 (9th Cir. 1982)
(noting that the airline industry is no longer in its infancy, but insisting that a court
interpreting a treaty like the Warsaw Convention must “studiously avoid imposing its own
view of foreign policy objectives and must accept [those] . . . of the executive and legislative
branches”).
166. See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115
Stat. 230 (2001).
167. See Ciobanu, supra note 2, at 8.
168. Id.
169. 540 U.S. 644 (2004).
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1. Tort Law Is Not Precluded from Accident Analysis
Simply because the Montreal Convention is an exception to tort
principles does not mean courts cannot use these principles to interpret the
extent of this exception. Although the accident requirement is a departure
from the foundational tort principle of full compensation for injury victims
because it limits a claimant’s ability to recover if the injury does not fit
within the requirement (therefore leaving some people without a valid claim
under the Convention),170 this does not preclude tort law’s use to figure out
what constitutes an “accident.”
Doing so is consistent with the
conventions’ creators’ intentions, subsequent U.S. cases interpreting Saks,
and domestic flight liability standards.
In fact, the Warsaw Convention “based its approach toward air carrier
liability on the fault theory of tort.”171 Its creators uniformly spoke of
rendering air carriers responsible only for injuries they could have
reasonably prevented.172 For instance, the original Warsaw Convention
provided as a valid defense that air carriers took all necessary measures to
avoid the damage.173 Courts hold the “all necessary measures” defense
should be interpreted as “all reasonable measures,”174 based on the
reasonableness idea embodied in tort law. This is in line with tort
negligence principles implicating only those who have committed a wrong
or have failed to protect people for whom they are responsible from injury
sources relatively under their control.175 It is also consistent with American
airline liability legislation outside the Montreal Convention, which states,
170. In re Inflight Explosion on Trans World Airlines, Inc., 778 F. Supp. 625, 631
(E.D.N.Y. 1991) (noting that the Warsaw Convention’s limit is a “statutory departure” from
the idea of full compensation for tort victims, a “conceptual underpinning[] of modern
American tort law”); see also JOHN G. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 3–5 (9th ed. 1983);
Abeyratne, supra note 54, at 256 (“It is an incontrovertible principle of tort law that tortious
liability exists primarily to compensate the victim by compelling the wrongdoer to pay for
the damage he has done.”); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Tort Law and
Moral Luck, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1123, 1135 (2007) (observing that tort law “is a law that
empowers victims to respond to wrongdoers whose wrongs have injured them”).
171. Abeyratne, supra note 54, at 256. See generally Ruwantissa I.R. Abeyratne, Liability
for Personal Injury and Death Under the Warsaw Convention and Its Relevance to Fault
Liability in Tort Law, 21 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 1 (1996). It is interesting how industrial
growth fuels legislation: the Montreal Convention and Warsaw Convention created the
“accident” requirement to protect the young airline industry, while the fundamental fault and
negligence principles upon which the conventions were created themselves came from the
eighteenth century need to protect new industries from previous tort law’s strict liability
scheme. See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 30 (1972)
(observing that the underpinning of American tort jurisprudence developed itself to subsidize
“the expanding industries of the nineteenth century”).
172. See supra note 95; see also Lowenfeld & Mendehlson, supra note 28, at 500; supra
note 49 and accompanying text.
173. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 27, art. 20.
174. See, e.g., Obuzor v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, No. 98 Civ. 0224 (JSM), 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5317, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 1999).
175. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 170, at 1123–24 (“On its face, tort law is a law
of wrongs. The word ‘tort’ means wrong. . . . Substantive tort doctrine is filled with rules
and concepts that express the idea of one person wronging another.”); see also supra note 16
and accompanying text.
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“A carrier of passengers by airplane is not an insurer of the passengers’
safety, and its liability for injury to or the death of a passenger must be
based upon some negligence or fault for which the carrier is
responsible.”176
Additionally, to bolster their holdings’ validity, U.S. courts point out
their decisions’ consistency with American tort jurisprudence.177 One can
view Saks’s “unusual or unexpected” measure as embracing tort law’s
integral accident inquiry role because it brings in an element of
foreseeability.178 Courts also have explicitly held that whether claimants
are “entitled to assert the Warsaw Convention [causes of action]” and what
their respective rights are should “be determined by reference to other
federal statutes”—the majority of which are based on foundational tort
jurisprudence.179 In fact, the Second Circuit has explicitly “adopt[ed] the
federal common law of torts to construe the [Montreal] Convention.”180
As such, liability limitations in tort law—including ideas of contributory
negligence, reasonableness, and foreseeability—should apply to whether
incidents are considered within the definition of an article 17 accident. The
Saks holding, the legislative histories of the conventions, and subsequent
interpretation of the conventions all support a requirement that an
“accident” be (1) an unusual or unexpected happening, (2) external to the
passenger, (3) causally connected to the operation of an aircraft, and (4)
consistent with common law tort jurisprudence evaluating the causal
connection. This definition, albeit abstract, removes some of the subjective
fact-based inquiry and ambiguity as to what is and is not a Montreal
Convention article 17 accident throughout U.S. courts. This is illustrated in
176. 8A AM. JUR. 2D Aviation § 116 (2015); see also Magan v. Lufthansa German
Airlines, 339 F.3d 158, 162 n.3 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Courts have theorized that one of the
guiding principles that pervades, and arguably explains, the original Convention, the
subsequent modifications, and even the Court’s decision in Saks, is an apportionment of risk
to the party best able to control it . . . .”).
177. See, e.g., Day v. Trans World Airlines Inc., 528 F.2d 31, 34 (2d Cir. 1975) (noting
that its decision indemnifying Trans World Air is consistent with “modern [tort] theories of
accident cost allocation”); In re Inflight Explosion on Trans World Airlines, Inc., 778 F.
Supp. 625, 638 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (noting that the Court’s decision in E. Airlines, Inc. v.
Floyd, 499 U.S. 530 (1991), is “consistent with American tort law”).
178. See Pastor, supra note 32, at 580–81 (“[The Saks] result is fully consistent with U.S.
tort law. . . . [A]llowing such claims in the absence of a federal tort law would run counter
to the primary purpose of the Warsaw Convention—providing uniformity in the law
governing international air transportation.”).
179. See In re Inflight Explosion, 778 F. Supp. at 632 (quoting In re Mex. City Aircrash
of October 31, 1979, 708 F.2d 400, 415 (9th Cir. 1983)); see also Federal Tort Claims Act,
28 U.S.C. §§ 2671–2680 (2012) (premising the ability of a victim to sue government on tort
principles, including negligence and foreseeability); Federal Employers’ Liability Act of
1908, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60 (rendering employers liable for tortious activity and using tort
tenets such as negligence and proximate cause).
180. In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie on Dec. 21, 1988, 928 F.2d 1267, 1270 (2d Cir.
1991) (“[B]ecause air carrier liability is a uniquely international problem requiring uniform
interpretation, the Convention must be interpreted according to federal common law.”); see
id. at 1279 (“[W]e look to the common law of tort in order to determine the elements of the
cause of action under the Convention.”). But see Wallace v. Korean Air, 214 F.3d 293, 301
(2d Cir. 2000) (holding an airline liable for a sexual assault even though the assault was not
proximately caused by the operation of the aircraft).
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the Supreme Court decision Olympic Airways v. Husain,181 described
further below.
2. Applying Tort Principles to Article 17 Analyses:
A Reexamination of Olympic Airways v. Husain
In Husain, the Supreme Court held Olympic Airways liable for a
passenger’s death from smoke exposure after a flight attendant refused to
move him away from the smoking section.182 The Court, petitioner, and
respondent all focused on the flight attendant’s refusal to move the
passenger’s seat and viewed the relevant question of law as whether a
failure to act could constitute an “accident.”183 Both parties denounced
using a negligence inquiry into whether the incident was an article 17
accident and instead focused on the Saks unusual or unexpected measure.184
This ignores the Saks’s implication that a causal connection to aircraft
operation is necessary and that using tort law to interpret that causal
requirement was not only permitted but also advocated by Saks, its progeny,
and the conventions’ legislative histories.185
Husain did not hold that omission could be considered an action in
general, because the airline attendant’s refusal to move the decedent can be
seen as an affirmative action, not an omission.186 However, the majority’s
dicta noted that “the failure of an airline crew to take certain necessary vital
steps could quite naturally and, in routine usage of the language, be an
‘event or happening.’”187 In his dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia focused on
the dangers of considering omissions as “accidents” for article 17
analyses188: it made carriers liable for anything that may occur on the plane
whether or not the air carrier could have prevented it, which is far past what
181. 540 U.S. 644 (2004).
182. See id. at 647; accord Thomas Adam Peters, Olympic Airways v. Husain: The
United States Supreme Court Expands the Scope of an “Accident” for Purposes of Article 17
of the Warsaw Convention and Consequently Contradicts Its Application of Multilateral
International Treaty Interpretation, 31 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 193, 201 (2006) (“The flight
attendant told them they could switch seats if they were able to find another passenger
willing to do the same. The flight attendant refused to offer or provide any type of
assistance. As the smoke increased, [the decedent] walked to the front of the plane, visibly
having difficulty breathing.”).
183. See DiGiacomo, supra note 96, at 439 & nn.251 & 260–61 (citing both petitioner’s
and respondent’s briefs in Husain); see also Husain, 540 U.S. at 655–57 (discussing why a
failure to act can be considered an “accident” under the Warsaw Convention).
184. See Husain, 540 U.S. at 654 (“The distinction between action and inaction, as
petitioner uses these terms, would perhaps be relevant were this a tort law negligence case.
But respondents do not advocate, and petitioner vigorously rejects, that a negligence regime
applies under Article 17 of the Convention.”).
185. See Peters, supra note 182, at 202 (“The Court dismissed the action versus inaction
distinction reasoning that Article 17 does not support the rules of an ordinary tort law
negligence regime.”); see also supra Part III.B.1.
186. See Field, supra note 65, at 87 (noting the flight attendant’s rejection of an explicit
request for assistance “was clearly something more than mere inaction”).
187. Husain, 540 U.S. at 656 n.10.
188. See Peters, supra note 182, at 205 (noting the dangers of the Husain decision,
including that international air carriers are now “easy targets for passengers with a knack for
creative legal schemes”).
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legislators originally intended and which could potentially “transform the
airline into an insurer for any harmful event.”189
The focus in Husain should have been whether the causal connection to
the aircraft operation—the flight attendant’s refusal to move the decedent—
was, within American tort jurisprudence, a legitimate proximate cause of
the passenger’s injury. If found a sufficient causal connection, the refusal
would be an article 17 accident and make the carrier responsible for injuries
resulting from that refusal; if not, Olympic Airways would not be liable for
the passenger’s death.
An accident analysis anchored in tort law would still find Olympic
Airways liable while simultaneously solving the issue with which Scalia
was so concerned—putting strict liability on airlines.190 In common law
torts, a common carrier (like the owner of an airplane, a cruise ship, or a
bus) is liable for injuries that are foreseeable and within the carrier’s ability
to prevent.191 In Husain, the decedent asked multiple times to be moved
away from the smoking section and explained to the stewardess why he was
particularly sensitive to smoke.192 His injury was clearly foreseeable, and
therefore the air carrier’s refusal to move him—the causal connection with
his injury to the aircraft—was negligent and a legitimate proximate cause
within tort jurisprudence.193 Because the airline attendant’s refusal to move
him was (1) an unexpected and unusual occurrence, (2) external to the
passenger,194 (3) causally connected to the passenger’s injury, and (4) the
causal connection was sufficient according to common law tort
jurisprudence, it falls within the “accident” definition of article 17.
Using tort law to analyze Montreal Convention accident causal
connections is a consistent and equitable strategy to impose liability on air
carriers in line with the Convention’s creators’ intent. It is a strategy that

189. Ciobanu, supra note 2, at 17; see also infra Part III.C. Scalia noted that the Saks
Court did not intend for omissions to be considered “accidents” by pointing out the two ways
to define “accident.” The first refers to something unintentional or not purposeful—in
Scalia’s words, “as in, ‘the hundred typing monkeys’ verbatim reproduction of War and
Peace was an accident.’” See Husain, 540 U.S. at 659 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The second
refers to an unusual or unexpected event, whether intentional or not. See id. The Supreme
Court in Saks disregarded intention and chose the latter definition, and, as Scalia explained,
“while there is no doubt that inaction can be an accident in the former sense . . . whether it
can be so in the latter sense is questionable.” Id.
190. See Peters, supra note 182, at 193 (“Justice Scalia’s dissent in [Husain is] on point
and more congruent not only with previous Supreme Court decisions, but also with the
ultimate goal of the Warsaw Convention.”).
191. See 8A AM. JUR. 2D Aviation § 117 (2015) (“A common carrier owes a duty of
utmost care and vigilance of a very cautious person towards its passengers.”); see also
Wilbur J. Russ, Comment, Tort Liability of Air Carriers to Their Passengers, 39 CALIF. L.
REV. 541, 542 (1951).
192. See Husain, 540 U.S. at 647–49.
193. See Fulop v. Malev Hungarian Airlines, 175 F. Supp. 2d 651, 663 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(“The air carrier . . . could not be reasonably expected to anticipate and protect against every
cause of injury which results solely from a traveler’s internal reaction to normal flight
operations or other like conditions peculiar to or uniquely known only by a particular
passenger.”).
194. See DiGiacomo, supra note 96, at 441.
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avoids sweeping fact-based holdings that further complicate accident cases
and go against the American sense of integrity.195
C. What Copassenger Torts Are Article 17 Accidents?
Understanding that a causal connection with aircraft operation is
necessary for incidents to be Montreal Convention accidents and that the
causal connection must be in line with tort jurisprudence simplifies
analyzing whether airlines should be responsible for a copassenger tort. In
addition to this simplification, it allows copassenger tort cases a measure of
predictability important to carriers, claimants, and governments. This
understanding also will keep copassenger tort decisions in line with the
original Montreal Convention goal of protecting air carriers, while also
incentivizing airlines to maintain diligent observation and security
measures.196
In tort jurisprudence, premises owners do not have a duty to protect
people from others unless the owners see foreseeable indicators that another
patron or a third party will inflict harm on one of its patrons; only then does
a duty to act develop.197 Indicators of foreseeability include previous
incidents by that patron or third party on the property.198 When an airplane
is the tort’s premises, there is a minimal chance that a particular group of
flight attendants will encounter a passenger they have previously seen
commit a copassenger tort. However, there remains a foreseeability
requirement to implicate an airline for injuries sustained by passengers.
For example, a fistfight between two sober passengers has nothing to do
with aircraft operation, was not foreseeable, “nor may carriers easily guard
against such a risk through the employment of protective security
measures”; therefore air carriers should not be responsible for resulting
injuries.199 This is in line with tort law common carrier liabilities and the
duty to protect others from the conduct of third parties: without an
195. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 170, at 1135–36 (explaining American law’s
coupling of liability with a proximately caused wrongdoing in that “[t]ort law identifies
domains of conduct that constitute a mistreatment of one person by another, such that the
person who suffers the mistreatment is entitled to some sort of recourse against the
wrongdoer”).
196. See Fulop, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 663 (“[L]iability for accidents whose proximate ties to
causation may be traced to some deviation from normal aircraft or airline operation or
procedure would place the burden on the party best situated to know what went wrong, and
most able to control, prevent and insure against the eventuality.”).
197. And therefore, by not acting, the premises owner will be held liable for the patron’s
injuries. See, e.g., Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill, 113 P.3d 1159, 1168–69 (Cal. 2005) (noting
that “only when ‘heightened’ foreseeability of third party criminal activity on the premises
exists—shown by prior similar incidents or other indications of a reasonably foreseeable risk
of violent criminal assaults in that location—does the scope of a business proprietor’s
special-relationship-based duty include an obligation”).
198. See id.
199. Price v. British Airways, No. 91 Civ. 4947 (JFK), 1992 WL 170679, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
July 6, 1992); see also Stone v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 905 F. Supp. 823, 826–27 (D. Haw.
1995) (holding that an airline was not liable for injuries sustained by a first-class passenger
when punched by another passenger because the injury was not an “accident derived from air
travel”).
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incident’s foreseeability, there is no duty.200 However, when an airline’s
attendant negligently violates the carrier’s policy by overserving alcoholic
beverages to a passenger who then injures another passenger, the injury is
causally connected enough to the aircraft to render the carrier responsible
(because it is foreseeable that getting a passenger drunk will result in
misbehavior).201
Canonizing this “accident” definition would relieve airlines of liability
for sexual assaults that occur on planes when alcohol was not served to the
perpetrator and when there was no other foreseeability indicator for the
assault. In these situations, the air carrier is not involved in the chain of
causation: a sexual assault is not causally related to the operation of an
aircraft.202 Courts would not have to use the shaky logic of Wallace v.
Korean Air,203 which attributes usual and expected aspects of flights (e.g.,
close quarters, having lights off) to inherent air travel risks and therefore
implicates the air carrier.204 The Wallace Court did not find the carrier
liable for the sexual assault (which could be seen as “internal” to the pair of
passengers) but rather for the “characteristics of air travel [that] increased
[Wallace’s] vulnerability to assault.”205 If courts were to continue using the
Wallace logic, it would force airlines to, in order to escape liability, keep
the lights illuminated on long flights and require passengers to stay
awake—both conditions that would likely increase air rage and create more
copassenger torts—bad for airlines, passengers, safety, and policy.206
CONCLUSION
Protecting airlines, and the legislative histories corroborating this goal,
should not be shunted aside in favor of a broader interpretation of the
conventions forcing air carriers to compensate victims for any injury
occurring on a plane. Airlines should not be strictly liable for injuries that
occur onboard: nothing in the Warsaw and Montreal Conventions’ histories
nor in the tort jurisprudence surrounding them indicates otherwise. The
200. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
201. See, e.g., Oliver v. Scandinavian Airlines Sys., No. M-82-3057, 1983 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17951, at *6 (D. Md. Apr. 5, 1983) (finding that, when a passenger was overserved
alcohol, fell on another passenger, and injured the second passenger, it was an article 17
accident). But see Lahey v. Sing. Airlines, Ltd., 115 F. Supp. 2d 464, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(noting that “the actions of the crew are not relevant to the determination of whether [an]
assault was an ‘accident’”).
202. See Wallace v. Korean Air, No. 98 Civ. 1039 (RPP), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4312, at
*16 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 1999) (finding that a sexual assault by a copassenger was not an
article 17 accident because “[a]n event cannot fall within the operation of the aircraft if that
event is not within the airline’s purview or control”); see also Ciobanu, supra note 2, at 17.
But see Langadinos v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 199 F.3d 68, 72 (1st Cir. 2000) (allowing a sexual
assault claim to survive solely because the perpetrator was overserved alcohol, noting that
“[w]ithout the allegation of over-serving, . . . American could not bear any causal
responsibility for Langadino’s injuries and there would be no Warsaw Convention
accident”).
203. No. 98 Civ. 1039 (RPP), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4312 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 1999).
204. See Wallace v. Korean Air, 214 F.3d 293, 299 (2d Cir. 2000).
205. See id. at 294.
206. See Ciobanu, supra note 2, at 17–18.
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subsequent interpretation of the Warsaw and Montreal Conventions, both
created to protect airlines, has distorted the accident requirement to hold air
carriers responsible beyond the limits to which they would be held
accountable by tort jurisprudence.
In order to be an article 17 accident, an incident must be (1) unusual or
unexpected, (2) external to the passenger, (3) causally connected to the
operation of the aircraft, and (4) the causal connection must be sufficient
under a traditional tort law evaluation. Using this definition makes sure that
courts are ruling in a manner consistent with Saks, the conventions’
legislative histories, and notions of responsibility and morality. This
definition is especially helpful in analyzing copassenger torts, where the
causal connections are intricate and where American tort jurisprudence has
a rich history of assigning liability to the premises owner or other actors.
Ultimately, this narrower definition of article 17 accidents gives courts,
airlines, and claimants their deserved predictability, protection, and justice.

